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THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) IN NEED OF ECOLOGICAL 
REFORM? - A CLOSE LOOK AT THE EXISTING PROPOSALS BY THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
 




As of 1998, the debate on ”Trade and Environment” has been going on for almost ten years. 
After the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round1 in 1993 and in view of the newly 
created World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 many observers thought that the WTO 
would now approach the existing problems in this field without further delay. These expecta-
tions were reinforced by the Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment on occasion of 
the signature of the Final Act in Marrakesh2 on 14 April 1994 and the creation of a Commit-
tee on Trade and Environment (CTE) in early 1995.3 
The reality, however, proved to be different. After some initial enthusiasm, the impetus 
seems to have slowed down considerably and the work presented by the CTE at the first 
Meeting of the Contracting Parties4 of the WTO in December 1996 in Singapore was not up 
 
* Dr. rer. publ. et lic. iur. (St. Gallen), LL.M. (EUI), Graduate of the Academy of European 
Law (Florence) and International Law (The Hague). Lecturer at the University of St. Gallen 
and currently visiting lecturer at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia).  
1 The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise international trade in the 
framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was started in 1986 and 
concluded in 1993, leading to the signature of the Final Act in 1994. It led, in particular, to the 
creation of the new WTO (coming into effect on 1 January 1995) and an extension to trade in 
services and trade-related intellectual property rights.  
2 Marrakesh Decision on Trade and Environment, as adopted by the Heads of Governments and 
States on occasion of the signature of the Final Act including the Results of the Uruguay 
Round on 14 April 1994, as reprinted, for example, in GATT, The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (GATT, Geneva, 1994).  
3 The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) replaced in 1995 the old GATT Working 
Group on Environmental Measures in International Trade (EMIT), as established as early as 
in 1971, whose work temporarily had been taken up by the Sub-committee on Trade and En-
vironment under the Preparatory Committee for the WTO in 1993/4. 
4 See the Singapore Declaration by the Heads of Governments and States, as adopted in Singa-
pore on 13 December 1996 and reprinted, for example, in WTO Focus (January 1997), at 7. 
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to the high expectations by environmentalists and international lawyers.5 While the current 
problems seem to be identified6, the solutions suggested by legal writers, NGOs and other 
actors seem far from any form that could reach consensus. On the whole, there are only a few 
concrete proposals for a reform of the WTO and especially the GATT system. They generally 
ask for the introduction of substantive or procedural provisions into the existing treaties in 
order to take account of today’s regional and global ecological problems. 
The European Community due to its commercial strength is undoubtedly one of the main 
actors within the WTO besides the United States. It is therefore interesting to observe that, in 
particular, the European Parliament has closely followed the trade and environment debate 
since the early 1990s and actively participated in the debate on the ecological reform of the 
world trading system and, in particular, the WTO and thereby constantly pushed the Com-
mission to take action (admittedly with variable success). The following article therefore tries 
to analyse the development of the European Parliament’s various proposals over time in view 
of the current debate and to place their views and suggestions within the framework of the 
general debate in order to show which positions are taken by the European Parliament, how 
much they are backed by the Commission and the Council, and to what extent they contrast 
with the views expressed by other main actors such as NGOs, developing countries and the 
various international organisations involved. 
 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DEBATE 
 
Within the European Union (EU) the debate on trade and environment has existed since the 
late 1960s. It was, however, a predominantly internal debate related to the relationship be-
tween domestic environmental policies of the member states and the establishment of the 
Common Market (later the Internal Market)7. Within the Community the ecological and eco-
nomic problems encountered over the years and the corresponding political tensions have led 
 
5 See also the European parliament’s Resolution A4-0156/965 (recommendations 6 and 7) as 
discussed in detail below.  
6 See, for example, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 
268-313, for a recent update. 
7 Article 100a EC Treaty, as introduced under the Single European Act in 1986, refers to the 
Internal Market, while the elder Article 100 EC Treaty speaks of the Common Market. Sever-
al authors have tried to show the possible distinction between the two concepts. Nowadays, 
however, the difference seems merely one of terminology and the concept of the internal 
market has mostly replaced the older term whenever the European Union’s market for goods, 
services, labour, and capital is concerned. See Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental 
Law in the European Community, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, 155-7 for details.  
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to the development of a fine-tuned legal system within the treaty to coordinate national envi-
ronmental policies and the needs for the establishment of the internal market8 which is sup-
plemented today by a proper Community environmental policy9. The latter is growing very 
fast and takes over more and more areas of traditionally domestic regulations in the field of 
the environment as well as in the related areas of health protection and consumer policy. 
With regard to the global level and the development of an international trading system (which 
at times can interfere with domestic and Community environmental regulations) the debate is 
much younger. While the 1971 Stockholm Summit on the Environment led to some work 
within the GATT10 and various other institutions on the relationship between global trade and 
environmental policy and actually was very important for the development of the Communi-
ty’s environmental policy11, there was done little follow-up work during the 1970s and 80s in 
this area. Mostly the two tuna-dolphin decisions12 of 1991 and 1993 (still within the old 
GATT dispute settlement system) as well as the discussion on the environmental aspects of 
NAFTA13 and the preparation of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit14 have started a new era for the 
trade and environment debate. It is in this context that several Community institutions, and 
most prominently the European Parliament, got involved into the debate on the need for an 
ecological reform of the world trading system.15 
 
8 See Ziegler, above n. 7, Chapters 3-6 for details.  
9 See, for example, Ziegler, above n. 7, Chapters 7-11. 
10 See GATT Secretariat, Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade - Studies in Inter-
national Trade No. 1 (GATT, Geneva, 1971).  
11 See, for example Ziegler, above n. 7, Chapter 7 and the literature referred to there. 
12 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, not adopted, Basic Instruments and Selected 
Decisions (BISD) 39th supplement (GATT, Geneva, 1993) 155 (Tuna Dolphin I) and United 
States - Restrictions on Imports of Trade, not adopted, reprinted in (1994) 33 ILM 839 ff. 
(Tuna/Dolphin II). 
13 See, for example, Bradley J. Condon, NAFTA and the Environment - A Trade-Friendly Ap-
proach (1995) 14 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 528-48. 
14 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), held on 3-14 
June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). 
15 Other institutions also prepared papers and reports on the relationship of the world trading 
system and the environment in preparation for the Rio Summit, such as most prominently the 
GATT itself in GATT, Report on Trade and Environment (1991) 1 International Trade 19-44 
and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development = IBRD) which 
had several working papers prepared, such as reprinted in Patrick Low, International Trade 
and the Environment, World Bank Discussion Papers vol. 159 (IBRD, Washington DC, 1992.  
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B. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE PARLIAMENT’S PROPOSALS (1993-96) 
I. Development 
 
Early in 1991 two members of the European Parliament (Pimenta and Muntigh) first called 
upon this institution to make recommendations on the building of awareness of sustainable 
development and its impact on trade into the basic statutes and working methods of either a 
revised GATT or a future World Trade Organization (WTO).16 The resulting report was ta-
bled on 3 November 1992 and discussed in the Parliament’s sitting of 22 January 1993 and a 
first Resolution on Environment and Trade (hereinafter: Res. 1993) was adopted.17 
Subsequently, from 7-9 November 1993 the Parliament was the host of a conference on trade 
and environment and on 24 March 1994 (in view of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
and the expected signature of the Final Act in Marrakesh in April) the Parliament adopted 
again a Resolution concerning the envisaged work programme on trade and environment as 
announced by the GATT Trade Negotiations Committee (hereinafter: TNC) on 15 December 
1993 (hereinafter: Res. 1994)18. This resolution confirmed many of the Parliament’s earlier 
recommendations and viewpoints and reminded the Council and the Commission that the 
 
16 Motion for a Resolution on the Future of Trade and Environmental Issues (B3-0668/91). At 
the sitting of 13 June 1991 the President of the European Parliament announced that he had 
forwarded the motion for a resolution by Messrs. Pimenta and Muntigh on the future of trade 
and environment, pursuant to Rule 63 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, to the 
Committee on External Economic Relations as the Committee responsible and to the Com-
mittee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection for its opinion. On 17 Ju-
ly 1991 the Committee on External Economic Relations decided to draw up a report and ap-
pointed Mr. Spencer as his Rapporteur who presented a draft report which was considered by 
the Committee at its meetings of 15 July, 30 September and unanimously adopted on 15 Oc-
tober 1992. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection ap-
pointed at its meeting of 27 September 1991 Mr. Pimenta a its draftsman. The draft opinion 
was considered at its meeting of 26 March and adopted unanimously on 7 October 1992. 
17 European Parliament: Resolution on Environment and Trade of 22 January 1993 
(A3-0329/92) , OJ 1993 C 42/246-50. The resolution of 1993 had basically three parts, after 
the traditional reference to existing documents and work done by the Parliament and other 
bodies, the second part contains 29 remarks taken from the report presented by the Committee 
on External Relations (A to Z and AA to AC). Finally, in its third part, the resolution con-
tained 14 recommendations with regard to the development of environmental issues within 
the future trading order. 
18 European Parliament: Resolution and Recommendation concerning the negotiations within 
the GATT Committee on Trade on the Agreement for a Work Programme on Trade and En-
vironment of 24 March 1994 (A3-1050/94), OJ 1994 C 114/35-8. 
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Parliament would have to consent to the ratification of any agreement resulting from the 
Uruguay Round and would use its power under Article 228 (3) EC Treaty to give effect to its 
suggestions - a threat that showed no consequences, however, in the European Parliament’s 
decision on the Final Act including the Results of the Uruguay Round on 14 December 
1994.19 
After the establishment of the working programme of the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment, the Parliament made again recommendations with regard to the EU’s contribu-
tion in view of the upcoming Singapore Ministerial Meeting in December 1996. In its Reso-
lution of 10 June 1996 concerning the Negotiations on Trade and Environment in the 
Framework of the WTO (hereinafter: Res. 1996a) the Parliament reiterated many of its for-
mer demands but added further details with regard to the areas it considered of primary im-
portance20. Immediately before the Singapore Meeting the Parliament adopted yet another 
Resolution21 (hereinafter Res. 1996b) in response to a communication by the Commission 
regarding the EU’s envisaged position at the Singapore Meeting.22 
 
II. Need to Act and Discontent with Current Situation 
 
The Parliament bases its considerations on the general desirability and need to integrate en-
vironmental concerns into the world trading order due to the urgent need to protect the global 
common resources, such as the oceans, the forests23, and the atmosphere (Res. 1993 E and P). 
It held from the beginning that all Bretton Woods Institution had to be reviewed in this re-
spect (Res. 1993 13) and underlined already in its 1993 resolution its discontent with the cur-
rent treatment of the relationship between trade and environment within the GATT. It held 
that the first GATT panel decision on the tuna/dolphin dispute between the United States and 
Mexico had been widely, if inaccurately, interpreted as threatening valuable existing envi-
 
19 European Parliament: Legislative Decision concerning the Proposal of the Commission for a 
Decision of the Council to accept the results of the multilateral trade negotiations in the 
framework of the Uruguay-Round of 14 December 1994 (A4-0093/94), OJ 1994 C 18/61-2. 
20 European Parliament: Resolution Concerning the Negotiations in the Framework of the WTO 
on Trade and Environment of 24 May 1996, OJ 1996 C16/260-2. 
21 European Parliament: Resolution Concerning the Communication by the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on Trade and Environment (COM(96)0054 - 
C4-0158/96 of 14 November 1996) (A4-0319/96), OJ 1996 C 362/245-8. 
22 European Commission: Communication by the Commission to the Council and the Parliament 
- Trade and Environment of 28 February 1996 (C4-0158/96): COM(96) 54 final. 
23 Interestingly the Parliament does not only refer to tropical forests, which are usually referred 
to because of their fast-advancing degradation and their importance with regard to world bio-
diversity. 
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ronmental legislation (Res. 1993 V).24 The Parliament also expressed its discontent with re-
gard to the ongoing Uruguay Round at that time, considering the failure to place the envi-
ronment on the agenda to be ”a major error” (Res. 1993 D) and criticising the fact that the 
Dunkel Draft did not incorporate the necessary environmental provisions (Res. 1993 L). The 
inclusion of such aspects in the Uruguay-Round had been part of the Commission’s V Action 
Programme for the Environment ”Towards Sustainability” - without any clear results to that 
moment. The integration of environmental rules should be no longer delayed as ”a trade free 
for all without rules would be a disaster for the global environment” (Res. 1993 E). While the 
subsequent establishment of a trade and environment agenda for the WTO by decision of the 
TNC Committee in 1993 was welcomed it was not considered a sufficient way of dealing 
with the current problems (Res. 1994 A). 
 
III. Environment - Social and Labour Rights -Human Rights 
 
The Parliament considers the protection of the environment just one of the common concerns 
that have to be addressed when looking at international trade today, - other such concerns 
being human rights and social and labour standards. The fact that trade takes place between 
countries where different legal and factual situations reign generates claims from affected 
industries that such differences lead to ”unfair” distortion of trade patterns and should there-
fore be harmonised or counterbalanced. The regulation of what were traditionally considered 
purely internal affairs (such as domestic environmental policy, human rights standards, la-
bour standards, competition standards) becomes thereby of common concern. Because of the 
irreversible processes of the destruction of the environment, however, its protection is con-
sidered different from other concerns, in so far as it deserves an immediate and direct ap-
proach in the existing trade agreements (Res. 1993 A). The Parliament thereby tries to avoid 
the problems generally referred to as ”slippery slope risk”, i.e. that too many policy areas 
might be integrated into the WTO system and that the over-regulation of domestic policies 
will ultimately make free trade impossible25. 
At the same time the Parliament does not want to rule out completely the desirability of some 
kind of social standards with regard to the trade and environment debate. The Parliament re-
 
24 Later, the Parliament felt such criticism by the public also following the gasoline decision of 
early 1996 (United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2, 
Report adopted on 20 May 1996, Appellate Body Decision (AB-1996-1) adopted on 20 May 
1996. For comments see Andreas R. Ziegler, Erste Erfahrungen mit der Berufungsinstanz der 
WTO (1996) 51 Swiss Review for International Economic Relations 417-32) and warned that 
such public discontent could jeopardise the future of the WTO (Res. 1996b 3).  
25 See, for example, the considerations made by the GATT Secretariat in its 1991 Report on 
trade and Environment. 
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fers to the link described in the Brundlandt Report26 between poverty and destruction of the 
environment, and holds that this particular connection indicates the need for account to be 
taken of social and human minimum standards, possibly in multinational agreements (Res. 
1993 B). While the Parliament still held in 1993, that the protection of the environment had to 
be considered with priority because of its irreversibility and global implications, the resolu-
tion of December 1996 states now that the issues of human rights and social standards can no 
longer be treated separately from the environmental questions and should therefore be ad-
dressed within the EU (1996b 25). 
 
IV. Financial Help and Transfer of Technology 
 
The Parliament accepts that the setting of minimum (environmental) standards may lead to 
considerable and continuing financial transfers between contracting parties (Res. 1993 Z), - a 
proposition generally feared by western industrialised countries and therefore generally re-
jected as a starting proposition. The Parliament holds, however, that the global destruction of 
the environment can only be overcome if less developed countries have access to modern 
technology in order to avoid pollution and produce cost and environmentally efficient. The 
Parliament therefore underlines the need to help ensure within the framework of development 
cooperation that the best available technologies can be applied (Res. 199310 [c]) which by its 
very nature implies again some sort of financial transfer (trade preferences27, unilateral re-
duction of debt, cost-neutral transfer or technology)28, as developing countries are usually 
unable and unwilling to purchase the best available technologies which are usually very cost-
ly and protected by the international standards applicable to international property rights.29  
The Parliament has full understanding for the concerns of developing countries that the 
United States and the EU might try to use higher environmental standards to disadvantage 
them but calls for closer cooperation in order to include them in the urgently needed action to 
 
26 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (generally re-
ferred to as Brundtland Report) (UN, New York, 1987)  
27 The Parliament therefore invited to the Commission to restructure its system of general pref-
erences in order to grant preferential treatment to other goods than tropical timber which had 
been produced in an environmentally sound manner (Res. 1996b 12) and consider a full tariff 
exemption of products from fair trade such as bananas, coffee, tea, and introduce in the short 
term so called fair trade quotas where lower tariffs apply (Res. 1996b 13 and 14). The Com-
mission seems sympathetic to such measures, see Commission Communication (1996), above 
n. 22, 17. 
28 As outlined in Res. 1996b. 11.  
29 As just reinforced under the TRIPs Agreement of the Uruguay-Round and heavily backed by 
the Commission. See Commission Communication, above n. 22, 28. 
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save the global resources (Res. 1994 4). It was therefore only logical for the Parliament to ask 
in its 1994 Resolution that the introduction of environmental considerations in the WTO sys-
tem should be accompanied by a raise in EU aid to developing countries (Res. 1994 2). For 
the European Parliament this seems to be an essential consequence from the special responsi-
bility of the countries of the ”North” for sustainable development at the global level (Res. 
1996b A). The Commission, obviously, is not at all willing to follow this approach. While it 
supports the general idea that technology should be made available to developing countries, it 
also holds that this should predominantly take place through education, technical support and 
cooperation in the framework of existing bilateral agreements and the multilateral schemes 
available within such as institutions as the World Bank30and related institution.  
 
V. No Green Protectionism 
 
In particular, with regard to developing countries, the Parliament also constantly addresses 
the threat stemming from the abuse of trade-related environmental measures for protectionist 
purposes and therefore underlines again and again the need to avoid the manipulation of the 
relationship trade and environment by protectionist acting against the interests of the devel-
oping countries (Res. 1993 C, Res. 1994 2, Res. 1996a 9, and Res. 1996b C). The Parliament 
defends the general principle that parties may use non-tariff barriers to protect the environ-
ment, the landscape and natural resources, provided they are not used as a pretext for protec-
tionism (Res. 1993 10 [c]) without, however, addressing the crucial question of how genuine 
measures can be distinguished from green protectionism. 
 
30 Commission Communication 1996, above n. 22, 16-7. 
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VI. Mutually Beneficial Relationship and Need to Balance  
 
The Parliament also subscribes to the general wisdom that sensible environmental guidelines 
do not hinder free trade and that trade can help the environment where specialisation uses 
resources without waste (Res. 1993 F) and accepts the general idea that free trade induced 
wealth normally leads to an increase in the proportion of national expenditure on the envi-
ronment (Res. 1993 M). But, at the same time, the Parliament underlines that economic 
growth alone cannot protect the environment for it is also necessary to take into consideration 
cumulative per capita claims on world resources and sustainability (Res. 1993 M and Res. 
1996b B). It therefore invited in 1996 the WTO to consider in its future negotiation rounds 
the fact that globalisation and increased trade involve also more transport needs and energy 
consumption and that these aspects have to be addressed (Res. 1996a 16 and Res. 1996b 18 
and 19). This statement seems particularly interesting in view of the EU’s internal problems 
with its energy31 and transport policy, as well as with regard to its negotiations of a bilateral 
agreement with Switzerland and the encountered problems with regard to road transport in 
1997. 
 
C. PROPOSED REFORM OF WTO INSTITUTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS 
I. General Environmental Principles  
 
On the whole, the general principles underlying the GATT are considered by the Parliament 
to be unable to solve the current problems. In particular, the Parliament requests that the 
GATT should take into account the internalisation of costs32, the polluter-pays-principle, the 
user-pays-principle, the precautionary principle and the principle of prevention (Res. 1993 R) 
as well as the principle of sustainability. The Parliament considers that the integration of 
these principles ”would imply a new structure of world trade because the internalisation of 
external costs ant the careful handling of limited resources would substantially alter global 
production structures” (Res. 1993 S and 2). After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round the 
Parliament suggested that also the TRIPs Agreement and the GATS should be reformed in 
order to integrate ecological principles into the existing agreements (Res. 1996b 23). 
In view of this analysis the Parliament underlined already in 1993 the need for a final decla-
ration accompanying the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Res. 1993 5) and to issue a po-
litical declaration expressing the contracting parties’ determinations that the Uruguay Round 
 
31 See also the Commission’s greenbook on an energy policy for the EU (COM(94)0659 - 
4-0026/95, and the reaction by the Parliament, in OJ 1995 C287/34. 
32 Here again explicit reference was made to the OECD guidelines of 1972.  
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would be fully consistent with global environmental objectives (Res. 1993 9). These recom-
mendations were obviously fulfilled in form of the Marrakesh Declaration on Trade and En-
vironment of 14 December 1994. The same is true with regard to the need, expressed by the 
Parliament, to integrate an additional recital concerning the environment in the Preamble of 
the WTO Statute as an integral part of the Uruguay Round negotiations (Res. 1993 6). The 
Parliament had suggested that it should read: ”recognising that their trade liberalisation en-
deavours should contribute towards the promotion of sustainable development in a manner 
which respects the environment”. While the Dunkel Draft had not contained any such refer-
ence, the Final Act contained the following statement: 
”Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full em-
ployment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production and trade in goods and services, while al-
lowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objec-
tive of sustainable development, seeking to protect and preserve the environment 
and enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development ...” 
This final form of the preamble only partly convinced the Parliament as it is reflected in the 
Parliament’s Resolution of 1994 (Res. 1994 3). The establishment of a Committee on Trade 
and Environment, as also requested for by the Parliament (Res. 1993 8 and Res. 1994 D) and 
finally announced in the Marrakesh Decision on Trade and Environment seemed only a logi-
cal continuation of the work started by the EMIT working group anyhow. The creation of an 
Environmental Council, as suggested by the Parliament (Res. 1993 7 and Res. 1994 5), how-
ever, was not taken up in the Final Act nor later by the WTO Contracting Parties. In the Par-
liament’s view this council should have been empowered to review all future WTO decisions 
in the context of their impact on the global environment and reported directly to the General 
Council before such decisions were taken, thereby implementing something similar to an 
”environmental impact assessment” of all WTO decisions.  
 
II. Non-discrimination and Ecological Aspects of Products 
 
The Parliament underlines that the existing GATT rules define the national treatment (which 
normally allows for the restrictions of environmentally undesirable product, provided that 
imports are treated in the same way as national products) in a way which can cause tensions 
in the setting of technical standards (Res. 1993 T). This is particularly true in the framework 
of Articles I GATT (Most Favoured Nation Clause) and Article III GATT (National Treat-
ment) as well as under the new SPS- and TBT-Agreements of the Uruguay-Round33, as it was 
 
33 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS-Agreement) and 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT-Agreement), as reprinted in Final Results of 
the Uruguay Round, above n. 2. 
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shown again most recently in the Hormone Dispute between the EU and the United States 
and Canada.34Probably in view of this upcoming dispute the Parliament made a statement in 
1996 (sharing the view of the Commission) that even under the new WTO system trade 
measures adopted in order to safeguard consumer health and environmental objectives were 
always available as long as they are product-related and applied without discrimination (Res. 
1996b 20 and 21), a view that was not fully shared by the appointed WTO panel in August 
1997 with regard to sanitary and phytosanitary measures falling within the scope of the 
SPS-Agreement.35 
Only in the resolutions of 1996 started the Parliament to underline the need to introduce a 
general prohibition of exports of domestically prohibited goods (Res. 1996a 5 and Res. 1996b 
10) and asked for a further development of rules applicable to voluntary and compulsory la-
belling schemes (Res. 1996a 5 and Res. 1996b 5 [d] and [e]). But at the same time it called 
upon the Commission not to consent to any regulations within the WTO which would be in 
contradiction to the existing regulations within the EU (Res. 1996 15). In particular, the Par-
liament held that any labelling rule should be based on a life-cycle assessment of a product 
(Res. 1996b 5[d], 16, and 17). In view of this situation the Parliament called also upon the 
existing working group to elaborate a series of GATT-compatible instruments of environ-
mental policies, focusing on fiscal and economic measures (Res. 1993 recommendation 11).36  
On the other hand, the European Parliament has stressed that the treatment of processes and 
production methods (usually referred to as PPM measures) that are environmentally undesir-
able is more difficult because of problems of definition and enforcement, and that labelling 
can only partially solve this problem (Res. 1993 U). It called therefore for a more generous 
interpretation or even rewriting of Article XX GATT (exceptions from general rules). In its 
view, such a reform is needed for the defence of the Global Commons (Res. 1993 AA and 
AB) and Articles XX (b) and (g) GATT should be extended to include better ”protection of 
the environment and the biosphere” and automatically allow for all measures taken according 
to Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) (Res. 1993 10, Res. 1994 1a, reiterated in 
Res. 1996a 11 and Res. 1996b 5 [a]). In its second resolution of 1996 the Parliament asked 
even for a rewriting or reinterpretation of Article XX (a) GATT (availability of exceptions in 
order to satisfy public moral) in order to allow contracting parties to take animal welfare con-
siderations into account when adopting trade measures (Res. 1996b 6). This is particularly 
interesting and understandable in view of the existing dispute between the EU and various 
other WTO parties with regard to import bans on products from animals caught by leghold 
 
34 European Community - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products, Decision of the Panel 
of 18 August 1997 (WT/DS26/R/USA) and (WT/DS48/R/Canada). 
35 idem. 
36 In 1994 the Parliament suggested, that besides the aforementioned Article XX also Article 
XVI (Subsidies) should be reconsidered in view of environmental subsidies (Res. 1994 1a). 





III. Greening of the Dispute Settlement Procedure (Environmental Expertise) 
 
In view of the first tuna/dolphin decision the Parliament called in 1993 for a general reform 
of the dispute settlement system in order to satisfy the taking into account of ecological as-
pects in the dispute resolution process. It therefore recommended the extension of the con-
sultations between the litigants under Article XXII GATT to include considerations with re-
gard to environmental protection and natural resources (Res. 1993 10[b])38. This claim for a 
better integration of environmental considerations into the WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism was reiterated in 1996 (Res. 1996 5 and 14). At the same time the Parliament continues 
to consider the WTO dispute settlement system the only appropriate forum for all trade and 
environment disputes, even if comparable mechanisms were available in existing MEAs 
(Res. 1996a 14 and 1996b 8). The Commission, on the other hand, rather supports the devel-
opment of separate dispute settlement mechanisms within more specialised environmental 
agreements.39 
On the whole, the Parliament held that the GATT in general had not sufficiently recognised 
the mutual influence of trade and environment and does so far not have the in-house expertise 
on the environment for its dispute panel decisions. In order to create greater transparency the 
Parliament asks for the development of ”Environment and Trade Guidelines” which should 
be developed in cooperation with environmental experts and INGOs (Res. 1993 AC and 1, 
Res. 1994 1[a] and 6, Res. 1996a 5, 17, and 18 and Res. 1996b 5b) and recommends that the 
GATT Secretariat should equip itself with environmental and financial expertise in the form 
of a consultative body composed of environmental experts (Res. 1993 3, Res. 1994 9, Res. 
1996a 14, and Res. 1996b 9). Such institutional changes as well as the suggested two year 
moratorium on all GATT panel decision concerning the environment, as suggested by the 
Parliament in view of the existing lack of environmental expertise remained, however, un-
heard (Res. 1993 10 and Res. 1994 5). 
 
 
37 See Regulation 3254/91/EEC prohibiting the use of leghold traps in the Community and the 
introduction of pelts and manufactured goods of certain wild animals originating in countries 
which catch them by means of leghold traps or trapping methods which do not meet interna-
tional human trapping standards of 4 November 1991, OJ 1991 L 308/1 ff.  
38 This had also been suggested by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Con-
sumer Protection, in PE 201.431/fin, Annex. 
39 Commission Communication (1996), above n. 22, 25. 
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IV. Competitiveness Issues and Proposals for Reform 
 
The Parliament had also to address the issue of the competition of competitiveness effects of 
divergent environmental standards in various jurisdictions trading with each other. The Par-
liament based its considerations on a World Bank Discussion Paper which estimates that en-
vironmental compliance costs rarely exceed 3% and that few actual examples can be found of 
relocation of in search of weaker environmental rules (Res. 1993 O), as it had also be under-
lined by the OECD in a study of 199540 (Res. 1996b C). The Parliament holds even that 
higher environmental standards can lead to higher competitiveness thanks to a more efficient 
use of raw materials and energy (Res. 1993 Q). 
Nevertheless, in view of the global problems and the trade distortion resulting from the miss-
ing internalisation of external costs in many countries the Parliament demands that the GATT 
should take into account the internalisation of costs and that the GATT EMIT working group 
should therefore have included in its working programme this issue (Res. 1993 R and 2). 
With regard to energy costs the Parliament even suggests that the fact that the external cost of 
increased energy consumption is usually not reflected in the price for energy leads to hidden 
”dumping”, thereby indirectly calling again for some form of energy tax (Res. 1996b 
19).41Furthermore, the Parliament holds, that the GATT should clarify that ”environmental 
dumping”42 is generally prohibited (Res. 1993 10 [c]) without, however, addressing what it 
considers environmental dumping and how this can be defined. This obviously strongly con-
tradicts the views generally expressed by the Commission that differences in regulatory 
measures (and in particular taxes) should not lead to the levy of any kind of eco-duties on 
trade and that the term ”eco-dumping” is not a valid description of such a situation. At the 
same time, however, even the Commission has suggested that the WTO should reconsider its 
current approach to border tax adjustment measures and reconsider whether ”taxes occultes” 
such as domestic taxes on energy (once incorporated in products usually referred to as ”grey 
energy”) could be taken into account.43 
In its Resolution of 1996 the Parliament for the first time addressed the issue that the ecolog-
ical behaviour of companies and multinational corporations should be addressed in the 
framework of a possible regulation of international competition rules under the WTO (Res. 
 
40 OECD, Report of the Ministers for Trade and Environment (OECD, Paris, May 1995), 5. 
41 Any such tax has encountered resistance so far within the EU and within most other indus-
trialised countries A few exceptions exist: Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden etc. 
42 The 1993 Proposal of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Pro-
tection had suggested to amend Article VI of the GATT in order to allow that ”where external 
environmental and resource costs are externalised these may be considered an inadmissible 
subsidy”. See Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, in PE 
201.431/fin, Annex. 
43 See Commission Communication (1996), above n. n. 22, 12, 14 and 25.  
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1996a 10)44. This idea is particularly interesting, as the introduction of general competition 
rules is one of the other current key issues in the WTO. In late 1996 the Parliament asked 
even for a commission-supervised code of conduct for multinational corporations, such as 
studied in the framework of the OECD and the UN (Res. 1996b 15). 
 
V. Cooperation With Other Institutions and Integrations of MEAs 
 
When making its own proposals the Parliament always refers to the existing work of other 
international bodies on the relationship of trade and environment such as undertaken by the 
OECD, UNCTAD45, and as developed in the framework of UNCED or the Earth Summit 
(Res. 1993 G, H, and I), as well as the work done within GATT itself, and especially the 
World Bank (Res. 1993 Introduction). The Parliament therefore welcomed the inclusion of 
the relationship between Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and the GATT on 
the agenda of the EMIT working group as early as 1994, which should have led to first results 
at the Singapore Meeting in 199646. It underlined that the working programme of the Com-
mittee on Trade and Environment should also have included the continuation of the work 
started at the Rio Earth Summit (Res. 1994 1 [a]), a proposal that showed no effect during the 
first two-years of the WTO’s existence47. The Parliament asked therefore in 1996 again for an 
intensified cooperation and exchange of information between the various bodies involved in 
the trade and environment debate (Res. 1996 3 and 5). 
The Parliament subscribes to the general statement that there is urgent need to ensure practi-
cal coherence between MEAs and the GATT/WTO system (Res. 1993 J, Res. 1994 B and 1 
[a], and Res. 1996b 5 [c]) and demands that the experience from other negotiations such as in 
the fields of tropical timber48, CFCs, global warming and even animal welfare issues (Res. 
1993 K) should be taken into account when addressing trade-related environmental issues 
under the WTO system. It underlines at the same time that multilateral measures involving 
trade measures should be compatible with GATT (Res. 1993 V and W) - as it was also held, 
 
44 The Parliament had expressed on other occasions its view that the integration of general 
competition rules into the WTO would be desirable, see OJ 1994 C 114/30 ff. 
45 Whose relevance is however considered ”doubtful”, as it is understaffed and ill-equipped to 
seriously consider environmental protection issues (Res. 1993 H). 
46 To the Parliament’s discontent the CTE work in this field remains without practical effect 
(Res. 1996a 5). 
47 See also Res. 1996a 2. 
48 In its 1994 resolution however, the Parliament showed big disappointment with the outcome 
of the January 1994 ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organisation) negotiations (Res. 
1994  8).  
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in principle in the two tuna/dolphin decision49. In order to address the legitimacy of MEAs 
the Parliament holds that the WTO/GATT parties should recognise a threshold to be agreed at 
an international level for the establishment of GATT enforceable multilateral environmental 
agreements (Res. 1993 4). The Parliament suggest a qualitative approach: once an agreement 
has been reached the participation of States which are responsible for a given percentage of 
the production of practices concerned it shall be considered automatically GATT-compatible. 
Obviously, the Parliament could not hint at where this threshold should lie. Nevertheless, the 
Parliament stated in 1996 that it considered that trade measures taken in the framework of 
MEAs should be generally available to the WTO parties also against WTO contracting par-
ties who are not member a particular MEA given this country does not comply with the ob-
jectives of the MEA at stake and thereby gains ”an inappropriate advantage from this behav-
iour and jeopardises the effectiveness of the agreement” (Res. 1996 12). Obviously the eval-
uation of such a situation would raise insurmountable problems in practice. 
In any case, the Parliament held from the beginning that the GATT should encourage multi-
lateral agreements (1993 consideration X) and that the GATT Secretariat should promote 
actively multilateral agreements amongst Contracting Parties (Res. 1993 3). It is in this con-
text again that the Parliament recognises that the conclusion of such agreements will probably 
not be possible without some form of financial incentives of countries currently applying 
lower standards than internationally agreeable. (Res. 1993 Z). It was however, only in its 
most recent resolution of November 1996 that the Parliament suggested the creation of a 
proper UN sub-organisation to supervise the existing international environmental agreements 
and to undertake work in order to improve the enforcement and development of such agree-
ments and, in particular, promote the search for solutions to the trade and environment debate 
(Res. 1996b 7).  
At the same time the Parliament holds that unilateral measures play often a role as catalysts to 
create multilateral agreements (Res. 1993 Y) and their effect should therefore not be com-
pletely neglected when addressing their legitimacy The Commission, on the other side, re-
mains strongly committed to multilateral solutions50and rejects unilateral measures in gen-
eral. With regard to unilateral PPM measures applied to enforce domestic standards in third 
countries, however, even the Parliament adopted in 1996 the view that they should not be 
available in cases where no European, North American or Japanese companies or their sub-
sidiaries were involved or a multilateral environmental agreement existed (Res. 1996a 13). 
This does not prevent the Parliament from supporting the availability of border-tax adjust-
ment measures for products which do not comply with internationally agreed production 
processes and methods (Res. 1996b 22), and the Parliament suggests that the tax revenue 
from such measures should be administered as a trust by the UN and redistributed to devel-
oping countries in order to advance the introduction of environmentally friendly technology. 
 
49 See above n. 12. 
50 Commission Communication, see above n. 22, 13. 






The Parliament is one of the few institutions which have dared to present complete proposals 
of reform for the GATT and WTO system. Their proposed modifications of the WTO are far 
from being generally acceptable and even within the European Union they differ considerably 
from the Commission’s views. Nevertheless, they are generally relatively creative and drafted 
in a way that could lead to a slim but effective reform. Apart from those suggestions which 
seem considerably biased due to internal EU legislation and existing trade disputes (e.g. ani-
mal welfare, hormone dispute, EU labelling schemes) they seem a good basis for further dis-
cussion. 
It is undoubtedly desirable that the WTO equips itself with environmental expertise and con-
science in order to settle more accurately trade disputes which involve important environ-
mental aspects. In principle, this is provided for already in the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU) of the WTO by the possibility for panels to call upon (environmental) ex-
perts, but the institutionalisation of environmental considerations - be it in the form of the 
integration of specific environmental principles (such as the polluter-pays-principle and the 
principle of life-cycle analysis) and/or an expert body advising the panels and other WTO 
institutions (e.g. environmental council, hearing of NGOs, etc.) - would be a more effective 
way of guaranteeing the integration of environmental concerns into the WTO deci-
sion-making. The national treatment principle (e.g. Article I, III GATT) and the related ex-
ceptions under Article XX GATT should be revisited in order to balance domestic needs for 
product standards and the trade liberalisation efforts of the WTO. At the same time, the issue 
of PPM measures and their treatment under the GATT, the TBT-and the SPS-Agreement 
must be approached in a more environmentally conscious way. The acceptance of something 
like a rule of reason (as under Article 30 EC Treaty)51 might be a helpful means to avoid 
excessively strict limitation of domestic policy choices without having to allow green protec-
tionism. 
Sooner or later the international community will have to address the question whether there 
should be some form of international harmonisation of (minimum) environmental standards 
with regard to production and product measures. Whether such harmonisation is economical-
ly and ecologically desirable remains disputed. The experience made in most domestic and 
regional free-trade areas suggests, however, that this may be the only way to overcome im-
portant trade disputes and allow for further liberalisation of trade. The financial questions that 
arise with regard to such harmonisation will have to be addressed very soon and it seems un-
avoidable that there is some kind of support for those countries currently producing with very 
low environmental standards. While the Parliament’s suggestions may seem too costly to 
 
51 See Ziegler, above n. 7, Chapters 3 - 5 on this issue. 
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many industrialised countries (including the EU Commission) they at least to indicate a gen-
eral willingness to accept the common but differentiated responsibility for the global envi-
ronment subscribed to at Rio. Such harmonisation could take place by way of MEAs at global 
and regional level. Therefore, the clarification of the relationship of MEAs and the WTO 
system seems of primary importance. 
